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Abstract
This paper considers the use of alternative welfare metrics in evaluations of in-
come inequality in a multi-period context. Using Norwegian longitudinal income
data, it is found, as in many studies, that inequality is lower when each individ-
ual’s annual average income is used as welfare metric, compared with the use of
a single-period accounting framework. However, this result does not necessarily
hold when aversion to income ﬂuctuations is introduced. Furthermore, when ac-
tual incomes are replaced by expected incomes (conditional on an initial period),
using a model of income dynamics, higher values of inequality over longer periods
are typically found, although comparisons depend on inequality and variability
aversion parameters. The results are strongly inﬂuenced by the observed high
degree of systematic regression towards the (geometric) mean, combined with a
large extent of individual unexpected eﬀects.
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11 Introduction
Evaluations of changes in the distribution of income must begin by deciding on a
number of fundamental ingredients, each of which involves value judgements. First, a
choice of ‘welfare metric’, concerning what is to be measured for each unit of analysis,
must be made. Secondly, a decision is needed regarding the time period of analysis.
Third, the unit of analysis itself must be chosen. Finally, the form of ‘social evaluation
function’, which encapsulates further explicit distributional value judgements, has to
be speciﬁed. The present paper explores the use of alternative welfare metrics in a
multi-period context, using the individual as the basic unit of analysis and an addi-
tive, individualistic Paretean social welfare function reﬂecting belief in the ‘principle
of transfers’ (whereby a transfer from relatively rich to poor individuals, leaving their
rankings unchanged, is considered an improvement). The welfare metrics are based on
alternative income concepts rather than, say, consumption or utility measures which
allow for variations in the value of leisure time.
Consideration of a multi-period context necessarily introduces the role of income
mobility. This implies that inequality of income measured over a longer period is lower
than that in the highest single year.1 A further argument concerns comparative static
changes: if higher annual income inequality is associated with increased relative in-
come mobility, it is possible that inequality of income measured over several years is
lower. Hence, longer-period inequality may fall, and welfare might increase, despite the
rise in annual income inequality: this is referred to as a ‘mobility oﬀsetting’ argument.
However, the welfare metric could allow for other eﬀects.2 For example, if there is
imperfect substitutability of incomes over time (Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morris-
son, 1992) and individuals are averse to income variability, the oﬀsetting argument is
weakened (Creedy and Wilhelm, 2002).
The discussion has so far been in terms of ex-post income measures. Hence, yet
another approach is to attempt to allow explicitly for the uncertainty associated with
mobility by constructing a welfare metric based on an ex-ante income measure. This
in turn requires the use of a model of expectations formation based on observed income
dynamics. The association between mobility and ex-ante income uncertainty has also
1Conditions under which inequality is lower than in all years are examined by Creedy (1997).
2The question of whether income mobility represents equality of opportunity, as in Bénabou and
Ok (2001a), is not considered here.
2been stressed by Parker and Rougier (2001), Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002)3 and
Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2008).4
This paper presents results where expected income is derived by estimating an au-
toregressive model of income dynamics. A closed-form expression for expected income,
conditional on initial income, is obtained. Thus a ‘rational expectations’ approach is
used, whereby individuals are assumed to form expectations based on the dynamic
model of incomes and associated parameter estimates. The model speciﬁes individual
income in a given period as a function of the relative distance from the geometric mean
of a previous period’s income, an individual ﬁxed eﬀect and a stochastic component.
The social welfare function, and hence distributional value judgements, examined are
based on the Atkinson (1970) inequality index. To illustrate the framework, longitu-
dinal data for individuals in Norway over the period 1993—2005 are used.
In Section 2 the data and the Atkinson index are brieﬂy described. Section 3
presents results using ex-post welfare metrics. Section 4 introduces ex-ante income
uncertainty and presents a procedure for using expected future incomes in the welfare
metric. Section 5 summarises the main ﬁndings.
2 Data and Inequality Measurement
2.1 The Data
The data used below come from Income Statistics for Persons and Families in Norway
1993—2005 (Statistics Norway, 2006). These data contain register-based information
on the whole population, derived primarily from information retrieved from all income
tax returns in the Directorate of Taxes’ Register of Personal Tax-Payers.
The income measure is annual income after tax. Thus income is deﬁned as labour
income, plus positive capital income, plus net capital gains, plus transfers minus direct
taxes. This is the deﬁnition used in all oﬃcial income statistics. Negative capital
income (interest paid on mortgages) is not included in the deﬁnition because there is no
3They present a decomposition analysis where the extent to which future incomes depend on current
income is separated from eﬀects due to rank reversals. For other decompositions, see Ruiz-Castillo
(2004), Van Kerm (2004) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006).
4Other studies involving mobility and long-term incomes include, for example, Shorrocks (1978a),
Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985), Fields (2010) and Hungerford (2011). For surveys of mo-
bility, see Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992), Maasoumi (1998) and Fields and Ok (1999).
3corresponding income from housing in the statistics. Estimates of income mobility are
typically sensitive to persons entering and leaving the labour market. Hence, persons
under age 26 and above 65 are excluded, and those with an income below 100NOK5
in any year are excluded. The eﬀects of inﬂation have been removed by deﬂating all
incomes to the 1998 level using the consumer price index.
2.2 The Atkinson Inequality Measure
Let individual i’s income (the welfare metric, ignoring the time period at this point)
be denoted yi, for i = 1,...,n. The Atkinson inequality measure is based on the use of











1−ε for ε ￿= 1
lnyi for ε = 1
(2)
Hence ε ≥ 0 captures the concavity of U, corresponding to the aversion to relative
inequality. Let yEDE denote the equally distributed equivalent income, that is, the
income which, if obtained by each person, gives the same social welfare as the actual





















for ε = 1
(3)
Atkinson’s index of inequality, I, is the proportional diﬀerence between the arithmetic
mean, ¯ y, and yEDE, so that:
I =
¯ y − yEDE
¯ y
(4)
and I reﬂects the ‘wastefulness of inequality’. Clearly, yEDE = ¯ y(1 − I) which, as the
‘abbreviated welfare function’, illustrates the nature of the ‘trade-oﬀ’ between ‘equity’,
1 − I, and eﬃciency, ¯ y.
5This is equivalent to US$15.50 using 2005 exchange rate.
43 Alternative Ex-post Evaluations
Figures 1 and 2 show, for the period 1993—2005 and for two inequality aversion pa-
rameters, the time proﬁles of inequality and the equally distributed equivalent. The
period may be divided into two periods of equal length, 1994—99 and 2000—05.6 The
ﬁrst period reﬂects a relatively stable degree of inequality while the second period dis-
plays more variability, initially decreasing and then increasing steadily. The increase
appears to be associated largely with changes in the distribution of dividend income.
In particular, the year 2001, when annual inequality was relatively low, is an exception
because a temporary tax on dividend income was in place. The steady rise in an-
nual equally distributed equivalent income is associated with growth in annual average
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Figure 1: Inequality of Annual Income: Atkinson Index 1993-2005, ε = 0.5 and ε = 1
A time subscript must now be added to each individuals’ income. For convenience,
the following ignores discounting. Consider ﬁrst an ex-post evaluation over T periods
6Although 1993 is not therefore used in inequality comparisons, this year is used as a base year
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Figure 2: Equally Distributed Equivalent Annual Income: 1993-2005




t=1 yit. Hence the welfare function is not actually concerned with the way in which
any individual’s income is distributed over the time period, and thus may be said
to reﬂect a lack of concern for the nature of the mobility process. For the period
1994—2005, the use of the annual average as welfare metric for each individual gives
Atkinson inequality measures of 0.076, 0.134 and 0.210 respectively for values of ε of
0.5, 1.0 and 1.5. These each reﬂect value judgements which tolerate substantial leaks in
making equalising transfers.7 These values may be compared with the annual average
inequality measures of 0.099, 0.181 and 0.298 respectively, showing that the use of a
longer period whereby individual incomes are averaged is in this case equalising.
Further details for the two sub-periods are shown in Table 1. For the second period,
the absolute reduction in inequality when using annual average income as the welfare
metric compared with annual average inequality, is double the reduction obtained for
the ﬁrst period. The inequality reducing eﬀects of using a longer accounting period,
7For example, if 1 unit is taken from A to make a transfer to B, where A is twice as rich as B, a
transfer of 0.5 units leaves social welfare unchanged if ε = 1. This falls to 0.25 units if ε = 2.
6Table 1: Annual Average Income Inequality and Inequality with Annual Average as
Welfare Metric
Period 1994—1999 Period 2000—2005
ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5 ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5
Inequality: Annual average of single year values
¯ Iy 0.084 0.165 0.263 0.108 0.188 0.307
Using each individual’s annual average as welfare metric
I¯ y 0.071 0.134 0.183 0.082 0.147 0.228
mentioned above, therefore appears to be greater in a period when annual inequality is
generally increasing.8 However,the percentage reduction in inequality is larger in the
ﬁrst period for ε = 1.5. This arises because the very high degree of inequality aversion
places more emphasis on the low end of the income distribution. Table 1 does not
report standard errors because the data cover the whole population.
The income mobility which produces the increasing annual inequality is thus also
responsible for reducing the inequality of a multi-period income measure (each person’s
annual average) below average annual inequality. However, mobility may not necessar-
ily be seen as beneﬁcial from an individual’s point of view. It may also be seen as an
undesirable source of economic instability. For example, individuals may for some rea-
son be unable to smooth consumption over time when facing income ﬂuctuations and
they might be averse to such variability in income. Imperfections of capital markets or
other constraints may prevent individuals from smoothing consumption over time; see
Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992).9
It may therefore be desired to allow, in the welfare metric, for an aversion to income
variability, as suggested by Creedy and Wilhelm (2002); see also Jarvis and Jenkins
(1998) on the disutility of income volatility. This can be done, in an ex-post context,
8This of course diﬀers from the comparative static argument discussed in the introduction, and
examined in detail by Creedy and Wilhelm (2002) in terms of inequality and social welfare.
9Shorrocks (1978a) argues that mobility is always desirable, whereas Chakravarty, Dutta and Wey-
mark (1985) establish a no-mobility hypothetical benchmark from which they can distinguish between
desirable and undesirable mobility. Like King (1983), they make use of the equally distributed equiva-
lent idea. The diﬃculties of establishing a reasonable social welfare understanding of income mobility
is discussed by Atkinson (1981), Dardanoni (1993) and Fields (2010).











The parameter γ measures the degree of aversion to variability of income over time, and
the same parameter is assumed to apply to all individuals. As ex-post values are used,
the aversion coeﬃcient, γ, is not interpreted in terms of risk aversion: this is discussed
in Section 4 below. The relative values of ε and γ determine whether inequality aversion
(of the judge whose value judgements are represented by the welfare function) is high
enough to overcome the individuals’ aversion to income variability over time. When
aversion to income variability is high relative to inequality aversion, a more ‘static’
society is preferred, in which income is more stable at the ‘cost’ of higher inequality of
multi-period income.
Table 2: Atkinson Inequality Measures with Aversion to Income Fluctuations
Period 1994—1999 Period 2000—2005
ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5 ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5
γ = 0 0.071 0.134 0.217 0.082 0.147 0.289
γ = 0.5 0.085 0.148 0.236 0.098 0.161 0.311
γ = 2.0 0.130 0.206 0.349 0.144 0.217 0.375
γ = 3.0 0.151 0.235 0.427 0.166 0.244 0.499
Table 2 shows the extent to which the values in Table 1 are increased when aversion
to intertemporal ﬂuctuations is introduced. In order eliminate the eﬀect of general
income growth over time, incomes were adjusted so that average annual income is
constant (and equal to the overall mean) in each period. Hence the inequality values
in the ﬁrst row of Table 2 diﬀer somewhat from those in the ﬁnal row of Table 1.
The inequality diﬀerences between the ﬁrst and second sub-periods are less inﬂuenced
by aversion to income variability over time. The absolute diﬀerences for γ = 0 and
positive γs are similar in the two sub-periods.
84 An Ex-ante Perspective
4.1 The Welfare Metric
The suggestion that relative income mobility is associated with uncertainty leads to the
idea that an alternative evaluation may be based on an ex-ante measure, rather than ex-
post incomes as in the previous section. For example, Shorrocks (1978b, p.1016) argues
that ‘interest in mobility is not only concerned with movement but also predictability’.
Furthermore, the uncertainty aspect of mobility is emphasised by contributions which
see mobility in terms of future opportunities, as in Bénabou and Ok (2001a), or account
for origin independence, as in Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002).
The approach considered here is to replace the above welfare metric with one deﬁned
in terms of expected incomes, conditional on income in a speciﬁed period, E (yit|yi0),
so that (5) is replaced by:









Here the parameter, γ, can be interpreted in terms of risk aversion. In a one commodity
setting and with indiﬀerence with respect to the timing of risk, risk aversion is the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Thus resistance to intertemporal
substitution, or variability aversion, is closely related to risk aversion.
Application of this approach therefore requires knowledge of the conditional expec-
tation of future incomes. The following subsection proposes a measure of expected
income obtained by modelling the income process.
4.2 Modelling Income Dynamics
Consider a dynamic process containing both a stochastic component and a component
in which changes depend on the position of individuals relative to the geometric mean;
see also Creedy (1985) and Creedy and Wilhelm (2002). As before, yit denotes individ-
ual i’s income in period t, and let µt denote the mean of logarithms in period t, with






exp(µt + vi + ηit) (7)
9Table 3: Parameter Estimates for the Income Mobility Process
Method and Parameter All years 1994-1999 2000-2005
LSDV
β 0.452 0.279 0.227
ση 0.276 0.280 0.282
AB-GMM
β 0.492 0.477 0.351
ση 0.415 0.308 0.316
GMMSYS
β 0.476 0.486 0.387
ση 0.419 0.309 0.313
where the stochastic component consists of an individual-speciﬁc eﬀect, vi, and a ran-
dom component, ηit, assumed to be independent of income, with a zero mean and
variance in each period of σ2
η. Equation (7) can be rewritten as:




+ vi + ηit (8)
The autoregressive parameter, β, captures variations in income that decline more slowly
over time. In other words it reﬂects movements in income that, while not permanent,
tend to persist for several years. Suppose also that in this simple income process, the
autoregressive parameter and income variance is common for all individuals, and het-
erogeneity in the process is represented through the individual ﬁxed eﬀect (individual
ﬁxed level relative to the mean) and the error term.
Table 3 reports results of using several estimators. These include the least squares
dummy variables (LSDV), and generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators as
in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Because the lagged de-
pendent variable is correlated with the error term, it has been shown that the use of
LSDV result in biased estimates. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested ﬁrst eliminat-
ing the ﬁxed eﬀect by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences, and then using yt−2 as instrument for
∆yt. However, this does not exploit all the relevant moment conditions so it is not the
eﬃcient GMM estimator. Arrelano and Bond (1991) derived all of the relevant moment
conditions from the dynamic panel data model to be used in GMM estimation. This es-
timator is known as the Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator. Other instruments have been
10suggested by a succession of researchers, such as the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and
Bond system estimator, which uses moment conditions in which lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences
of the dependent variable are instruments for the level equation. In practice, it is
diﬃcult to ﬁnd good instruments for the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced lagged dependent variable,
which can itself create problems for the estimation. Kiviet (1995) shows that panel
data models using instrumental variable estimation often lead to poor ﬁnite sample
eﬃciency and bias. Also, tests shows that none of the methods reject the assumption
of no autocorrelation in ﬁrst diﬀerenced errors.
However, the major aim of the present paper is not to estimate a dynamic model,
otherwise a more sophisticated econometric framework, with a richer speciﬁcation of
error terms and heterogeneous parameters, would have been used. Here, it is required
to produce a simple model of individuals’ expectations of future incomes. Table 3 show
that a common result for all speciﬁcations is that the estimated value of β is higher in
the ﬁrst sub-period than in the second sub-period, while estimate of σ2
η is higher in the
second sub-period. The lower degree of regression towards the mean and lower variance
in the ﬁrst period implies lower income mobility, but also higher predictability of future
incomes. Conversely, the parameter values imply higher mobility and less predictability
in the second sub-period. In the following subsection, reported results are based on
the Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator.
4.3 Inequality Using the Ex-ante Welfare Metric
In order to obtain measures for the contribution of the estimated income process to
the overall ex-ante welfare evaluation, a closed-form expression for expected income as
a function of income in the initial period, E (yit|yi0), is required. It is shown in the
Appendix that:
E (yit|yi0) = exp
￿
µt + β

















where estimates of individual ﬁxed-eﬀects, vi, are obtained using their sample counter-
parts. The corresponding equally distributed equivalent in terms of expected income,



















11from which, given the arithmetic mean, the Atkinson measure can be obtained in the
usual way. In this case it depends on the degree of regression towards the mean, the
income variance, the degree of aversion to inequality and the degree of aversion to
ﬂuctuations in income. When β < 1, the initial (relative) position is given less weight
over time, while the role of the individual speciﬁc position is increasing over time.
Expected income is also increasing over time. This is due to the particular loglinear
functional form chosen for the income process.
Table 4: Atkinson Inequality Indices for Expected Income
Period 1994—1999 Period 2000—2005
ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5 ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5
γ = 0 0.004 0.068 0.135 0.109 0.165 0.218
γ = 0.5 0.037 0.095 0.165 0.150 0.208 0.246
γ = 2.0 0.132 0.221 0.417 0.250 0.367 0.492
γ = 3.0 0.166 0.394 0.513 0.290 0.481 0.603
The inequality measures for the ex-ante welfare metric are shown in Table 4, where
again any eﬀects of income growth are eliminated by maintaining arithmetic mean
constant. These may be compared with Table 2. For the sub-period 1994—99, inequality
is lower for all values of ε examined and for the variability aversion coeﬃcients of 0 and
0.5. For the very high values of γ of 2.0 and 3.0, inequality is higher when the ex-ante
measure is used, particularly for the high inequality aversion coeﬃcient. The estimated
value of β is rather low while that of σ2
η is high. The considerable variability implied
by the high σ2
η would produce increasing annual inequality over time, without the
low value of β, implying considerable regression towards the mean. In the expression
for E (yit|yi0), the eﬀects of terms involving powers of β rapidly become insigniﬁcant.
Expected incomes are dominated by the high σ2
η which, for the high mobility-aversion
cases, implies a higher measured inequality. From (9), setting all terms involving β
t
and β
2t to zero and rearranging gives:














v is the variance of the ﬁxed eﬀect in the autoregressive income-generation equation.
12Therefore for higher σ2
v and lower β, as in the second sub-period considered, inequality
of expected values is quickly increasing towards a relatively high value.
In the ex-post case, there is less inequality than anticipated as a result of the re-
gression towards the mean. For the second sub-period, the role of unanticipated, but
systematically equalising, mobility is even greater and β is lower. Hence the ex-ante
welfare metric produces higher inequality, for nearly all combinations of variability
aversion and inequality aversion parameters, than for the ex-post metric. The ex-
ceptions are for the combination of low variability aversion with very high inequality
aversion. Also, the inequality diﬀerences between the two sub-periods are maintained
or increased when moving from the ex-post to the ex-ante perspective.
It may be argued that it is diﬃcult to interpret the results for the two periods in
Tables 3 and 4 in terms of diﬀerent income processes because they begin with diﬀerent
initial distributions. For this reason two sensitivity analyses were carried out. First,
it was assumed simply that (logyi0 − µ0) = 0 for all individuals (so that the ﬁxed
eﬀect is the only individual variation). Second, the same initial distribution was used
in both periods (hence, the second period process was estimated using the initial 1993
distribution. Unreported results show that the results are not sensitive to the choice of
initial distributions. This lack of sensitivity is likely to arise because of the high degree
of regression towards the mean.
Also, in (8) there are no other explanatory variables, such as age, family composi-
tion and education, but it is well known that income is systematically related to age.
Also, education inﬂuences the overall income level as well as the age-income proﬁle.
Family composition is another variable that may aﬀect individual income, especially for
women. These variables have not been used because they substantially complicate the
prediction of future incomes. While age is straightforward to predict, predicting future
family composition is less so. Education is challenging too, as the speciﬁcation already
accounts for a ﬁxed eﬀect. Thus, ﬁxed eﬀects soak up much of the explanatory power
of variables that are either time-invariant or close to time-invariance. Regressions were
in fact run using other explanatory variables (such as age, family composition and
education) which were found to lower the estimated autoregression coeﬃcient some-
what in all speciﬁcations, but did not change the overall result. This suggests that
the main diﬀerences between income mobility in the two periods’ is due to genuine
income dynamics rather than, for instance, substantial diﬀerences in family dynam-
13ics. Comparisons were also made using alternative income deﬁnitions. Labor income
yields similar estimates for the autoregression coeﬃcient, but exhibits a much larger
variance. For gross income there is less regression towards the mean than for the two
other income deﬁnitions (that is, higher β), and the diﬀerence between the two periods
is larger. Also, as expected, the standard deviation of gross income is higher than for
income after tax.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to consider the use of alternative welfare metrics in eval-
uations of income inequality when a multi-period income measure is used, and hence
relative income mobility plays a crucial role in inﬂuencing the relationship between
short- and long-period inequality. One basic approach, most commonly adopted in in-
come distribution studies, is to base measures on ex-post magnitudes. Using Norwegian
longitudinal income data, it was found, as in many studies, that income inequality is
lower when each individual’s annual average income is used as welfare metric, compared
with the use of a single-period accounting framework. However, the longer accounting
period can produce both lower and higher inequality than annual measures, depending
on the assumed degree of aversion to income ﬂuctuations over time.
The second approach took as its starting point the argument that relative income
mobility introduces uncertainty about future incomes, so that it may be desired to
evaluate inequality using an ex-ante approach. To this end, a regression model of in-
come dynamics was used in order to generate individuals’ expected values of future
income, conditional on actual income in a speciﬁed initial period. The use of expected
incomes was found generally to produce higher values of inequality over longer peri-
ods, although again comparisons depend on the assumption regarding the aversion to
income inequality of the social welfare function, and aversion to income ﬂuctuations
on the part of individuals. The results were strongly inﬂuenced by the observed high
degree of systematic regression towards the (geometric) mean, combined with a large
extent of random proportional income changes. The distinction between expected and
unexpected mobility was thus found to be important.
In the choice of welfare metric there is of course no single ‘correct’ approach, and the
contribution of the economist is to investigate the implications of adopting alternative
14value judgements. The present paper is therefore in this spirit of extending the range
of value judgements which can be examined.
15Appendix A: Expected Income
This appendix derives the expected value of an individual’s income, conditional on
income in an earlier period. Deﬁne zt, dropping individual subscripts, as:
zt = (logyt − µt) (A.1)
Inserting zt in equation (8) gives:
zt = βzt−1 + v + ηt (A.2)
Backwards induction yields:



















s + ξt (A.3)
where:
ξt = ηt + βηt−1 + β
2ηt−2 + ... + β
k−1ηt−k+1 (A.4)














The variance of logyt is thus equal to V ar(ξt), which, if η is normally distributed,
is from (A.4) given by a weighted sum of normal variables. This is also normally


























In general, if the variable x is lognormally distributed with mean and variance of






























This is the result given in (9) above.
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